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This study is a comparative analysis between the prof-
itability of defense and commercial aerospace business.
Corporate data including profit measures and the volume of
defense business were collected for a 22 year period from
1961 to 1982. The methodology uses regression analysis with
the percentage of defense business and the percentage of
capacity utilization within the aerospace industry as the
explanatory variables for profit. Finally, a brief analysis
of risk is included to provide a framework within which to
compare these profit levels. Briefly the findings indicate;
that defense contracting has, on the average, been less
profitable than commercial; that contractors earn more on
defense contracts during periods of increased capacity
utilization, and that defense contracting involves higher
risk. The author concludes that government acquisition
managers must be continuously aware of the implications of
these findings for individual contractors as well as for the
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Each year, the Department of Defense spends billions of
dollars to procure new military hardware. Modern sophisti-
cated weaponry is very expensive and therefore the industry
which serves the nation must be as efficient and cost-
effective as possible.
It is generally assumed that competitively-awarded,
fixed-price contracts yield the vendor a satisfactory and
"fair" profit in an efficient marketplace. Unfortunately,
over 80% of DOD ' s procurement dollars are spent using con-
tracts in which the price, cost and profit is negotiated.
The government must become concerned with the size of the
profit allowed on these contracts because the normal mecha-
nisms of an otherwise freely competitive marketplace may be
disrupted if prices are negotiated. If profits are too
high, the government is not spending the public's money
wisely. But if profits are too low, the contractor may
refuse to accept government business. A result might be
that defense dollars would be able to procure progressively
less hardware as lower profits attract fewer producers. In
the long run, the government may find a private industry
which is unwilling to, or worse yet incapable of, providing




The importance of profit in the structure of the DOD-
contractor relationship is evident in the Defense Acquisi-
tion Regulation [Ref. 2]. DOD policy states that profit is
to be utilized to stimulate efficient contract performance
as profit is recognized to be the basic motive of business
enterprise. Deputy Defense Secretary Clement stated before
the Joint Committee on Defense Production [Ref. 3] that this
same profit policy must be used to strengthen the defense
industrial base. Clements goes on to say that a "fair"
level of profitability on defense business works to the
government's advantage by attracting good performers, main-
taining a healthy competitive environment, and enabling
contractors to invest in new plants and equipment.
The reluctance of defense contractors to invest in more
efficient new equipment was attributed to relatively low
levels of profitability by Profit * 76 [Ref. 3]. Profit
policy adjustments were made subsequent to this study to
encourage contractors to increase their capital investments.
DOD intended that in addition to upgrading the industrial
base, the higher productivity achieved through modernization
would ultimately translate into lower procurement costs.
However a GAO review [Ref. 4] in 1979 found that although
negotiated profits had indeed climbed, capital investment




Another four years have passed since the GAO review, and
DOD is embarking on a new Acquisition Improvement Program.
Perino states [Ref. 5] that the root cause of many system
acquisition problems being addressed by the new program is
the historical attempt to limit profit on defense contracts.
He further argues that lower profitability translates into
lower equity investment which results in lower productivity
and increased acquisition costs. His statements in 1983
echo the conclusions drawn from Profit * 76.
Of course a second alternative for defense contractors
faced with low profit levels from defense work is to simply
not to compete. A report titled "The Ailing Defense Indus-
trial Base: Unready For Crisis" [Ref. 6] reported that
between 1967 and 1980 the number of companies in the base
had dropped from 6,000 to 3,500. Aerospace have had a grow-
ing commercial alternative to defense work as signaled by a
drop in government sales as a percentage of total sales for
Standard and Poor's Aerospace Industry from 69% to 48%
between 1971 and 1980 [Ref. 7]
.
Although much of the evidence argues for inadequate
profits from defense contracting, the facts are that many
firms still do compete for these supposedly "low profit"
contracts. Many large defense contractors are quite prof-
itable, and the feeling is that defense contracts can be
very lucrative. Being awarded the contract is the only
11

incentive for defense contractors to limit costs on their
contract proposals given that profits are initially nego-
tiated as a percentage of this figure. On those occasions
when historical cost data is unavailable or there is only
one source, the contractor can take advantage of the situa-
tion to pad his proposal. In this instance defense business
could be used as a training ground for new personnel, or as
a means of retaining experienced personnel when business is
slow, making it more "profitable" than the bottom line would
indicate. Presumably aerospace firms wouldn't compete if
profits were considered "too low," leaving the instinctive
impression that there may be more to this controversy than
meets the eye.
Numerous studies conducted over the past two decades
have sought to provide answers to the controversy surround-
ing the profitability of engaging in Department of Defense
(DOD) contracts. [Ref. 8] The question of insufficient,
adequate, or excessive profits on DOD weapons acquisition
programs is an ongoing one due to several factors. Ideally,
defense business should compete equally with commercial
business for available industrial capacity. This explains
the common practice of looking for "parity" in the profita-
bility of like government and commercial goods. Normally,
if a given type of business provided less than expected
returns, market forces would act to reduce competition for
12

this business and might eventually eliminate it. Such is
not the case with the Department of Defense due to the
monopsonistic nature of the government-industry relation-
ship, wherein at least some of the free market forces men-
tioned are bypassed. The ability of DOD , through its
acquisition regulations, to exercise significant control
over profit levels is a market imperfection which consti-
tutes a major variable in the solution. [Ref. 9]
Another factor contributing to the evolution of the
debate has been the inability to agree on the relative risks
associated with defense contracting. A study conducted by
the Conference Board [Ref. 10] contained interviews of 53
account executives from 31 financial institutions. The con-
sensus was that defense business was not sufficiently prof-
itable for the risks involved. Whether or not the banker's
opinion is correct may not be as important as their indis-
putably heavy influence over the availability of funds for
defense industry loans. Proponents of the low risk view-
point, on the other hand, cite such sureties as cost-based,
"negotiated" profits, Government financing through progress
payments, and a redirection of acquisition policy toward
reducing contractor risk, as evidence for their contention.
The politically charged characteristics of DOD acquisi-
tion procedures does nothing to stabilize the issue. Con-
gressional exposes of a few poorly managed contracts not
13

only drive industry and the services into opposing camps,
they also promote a long-term adversarial relationship in
which both sides are prone to disagree on the adequacy of
defense contract profitability. [Ref. 10]
Whatever the answer to the profit question, there is
little disagreement on the ramifications of inadequate
profits for defense contractors. Woody [Ref. 11] proposes
that defense business may become a "market of last resort,"
attractive only to less efficient companies. A reduction
in the quality of the competitors would further exacerbate
the quantifiable erosion of the industrial base previously
noted.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this study, the objective is to analyze available
published data with a goal of providing answers to the fol-
lowing questions:
(1) How profitable have major aerospace firms been in
their defense and nondefense business?
(2) Does the profitability level of defense contractors
reflect the degree of capacity utilization in the aerospace
industry?
(3) Are the profits associated with defense and commer-
cial business consistent with their respective risks?
The answers to the questions raised above can provide
valuable insights into the behavior of contractors when
14

dealing with DOD contracts. The answers also have signifi-
cant implications for DOD profit policy and its goal of
attracting a large number of the best contractors to defense
work.
D. RESEARCH METHOD
The research method consists primarily of simple linear
regression analysis used in a descriptive context. Since
government contractors do not publish the profits earned on
individual product lines, only the profits earned by the
corporation as a whole are available. Corporate profits
measured as a percentage of sales and of net worth, respec-
tively, are extracted from The Value Line Investment Survey .
In order to distinguish between profits earned on commercial
business as opposed to defense business, the percentage of
defense business (defense sales/total sales) is also
extracted and used as an explanatory variable.
The initial phase establishes a technique for relating
profitability to the amount of government business per-
formed. The second goal was to investigate whether defense
contractor profit variations could be partially explained by
the percentage of capacity utilization within the aerospace
industry. Capacity utilization figures came from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, while defense business profit measures
were taken from the results of phase one.
15

The final objective involves using risk analysis to
help explain profitability variations. Two risk measures,
Beta and PSI, were collected from Value Line and regressed
against the percentage of government business to determine
whether increased amounts of defense work correlate with
risk. PSI is an index of a stock's price stability and is
an indication of total risk while Beta measures a stock's
"systematic" risk.
Risk was also analyzed from the perspective of the
volatility of internal returns. A comparison was made
between the variation of accounting return on investment
(NI/NW) for commercial versus government business by calcu-
lating their respective standard deviations. Although a
simple analytical technique, the results are no less
convincing.
E. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The remainder of the study describes the analysis of
the data. Profit measures and percentages of government
business were collected for approximately 25 firms per year
over a twenty- two year span from 1961 to 1982. Having
gathered such a large data base, it seemed imperative to
exhaust the possible data arrangements in order to wring
from them as much information as practicable. The detailed




In order to clarify the presentation, the methodology,
analytical results and conclusions sections are all organ-
ized under the same format and in the same sequence as the
research questions. The sections are divided into;
(1) profit versus percent government business, (2) profit
versus capacity utilization and finally (3) risk analysis.
The findings support the concern expressed by many for
the state of the defense industrial base. On average,
profits for defense business as measured by NI/S and NI/NW
have been lower than the same measures for commercial
business. Although the net earnings difference is of
greater magnitude and is more clearly supportable when
measured as a percentage of sales, the difference is also
statistically significant when measured as return on net
worth.
With regard to capacity utilization, defense and commer-
cial business profits have both risen during times of higher
utilization. The most noteworthy finding in this section
may be that defense profits rise faster than commercial
profits, but never reach parity.
Risk analysis constituted the final section, and the
findings indicate defense business is a more risky venture
than its commercial counterpart. The volatility of returns
proved to be greater for defense profits as did the insta-
bility of the defense-intensive firms' stock prices. The
17

non-diversifiable "systematic" risk is not demonstrably
different for the two alternative types of business.
The conclusions to be drawn from these findings have a
common theme which does not bode well for the defense
alternative. Defense contractors have been shown to realize
a lower average return while incurring relatively higher
risks. All other things equal, managers of aerospace firms
would therefore be inclined to prefer commercial business
over defense work. The harbingers of a "market of last
resort," reduced competition, and a shrinking defense base
admittedly cannot draw definitive support from these find-
ings, but neither can we choose to ignore their message.
The inference to be drawn from the capacity utilization
analysis is that aerospace firms are apparently able to
negotiate higher profits on defense contracts when they
don't need the business. This ability to "drive a hard
bargain" apparently shifts to the Government's advantage
when business levels fall off. The buying power of the
Department of Defense has a significant influence on the
aerospace industry in general, and is enhanced dramatically
during periods of low demand from the private sector.
In short, there appears to be reason for concern but
not for alarm. "Continuing concern" may be a more appli-
cable comment, considering the long-term nature of the
defense contracting profit controversy. An awareness of the
18

problem over the years has done much to alleviate the con-
sequences. Defense managers must be kept aware of the
unique relationship between DOD and the aerospace manufac-
turers if the industry is to remain a strong and viable
component of the defense industrial base.
19

II. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
This chapter describes the approach used to carry out
the research objectives specified in chapter 1.
A. THE SAMPLE
To begin this study, data were obtained from the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) concerning annual contract pay-
ments to aerospace firms from 1975 to 1982. This informa-
tion was analyzed to identify which firms constituted the
major contractors for Navy aerospace defense business. The
companies listed in Table 2-1 were chosen as major contrac-
tors based on total dollars received as well as continuous
involvement with NAVAIR throughout the period: (sequence of
listing is not significant)



















This group of firms constituted a starting point for
selection of the sample used for final analysis. The
availability of data was another factor influencing the
sample. Suitable data was available for a 22 year period
from 1961 to 1982 from the Value Line Investment Survey .
Under its aerospace industry section, Value Line provided
financial data on approximately 25 firms each year. Com-
parison with the list above showed that Value Line was
reporting on all of the major NAVAIR contractors, although
a few were listed under the Multiform, Electrical, and
Electronics sections.
Several additional factors combined to determine the
final sample group. The entry and exit of new and old
firms, and other corporate manipulations during the 22 year
period made it impossible to track all but a very few spe-
cific firms over the entire period. It was therefore
decided to use all of the data available in the Value Line
Aerospace section as representative of the "industry."
The few NAVAIR contractors reported on under the Multi-
form, Electrical, and Electronics sections were also added
to the sample— specifically General Electric, Texas Instru-
ment, Litton, and Teledyne. Table 2-2 is a list of corp-
orations for which data were collected and the years over
which it was collected:
21






Beech 61-78 Teledyne 66-82
Cessna 61-82 McDonnell Douglas 66-82
Bendix 61-81 Ryan Aeronautical 67-67
Douglas 61-66 Sunstrand 67-82
Boeing 61-82 LTV Corp. 67-67
Garrett 61-62 LTV Aerospace 68-82
Martin Marietta 61-82 Curtiss Wright 69-75
Grumman 61-82 CCI 71-80
McDonnell 61-66 Southwest Airmotive 71-72
North American 61-66 TRE Corp. 72-82
Northrop 61-82 Rockwell 74-82
Piper 61-68 Lear Siegler 75-82
Republic 61-64 United Technologies 75-82
Rohr 61-82 Pneumo Corp. 76-82
Thomson Ramo 61-82 E-Systems 77-82
United Aircraft 61-74 Hazeltine 77-82
General Electric 61-82 Loral 77-82
Texas Instruments 61-82 Rockcor 78-82
Lockheed 62-82 Sanders Assoc. 78-82
American Bosch Raytheon 79-82
Arma/Ambac 62-77 Moog Inc. 81-82
Fairchild Stratus/ Atlantic Research 82
Hiller 62-82 Hexcel Corp. 82
General Dynamics 62-82 International
Ling Temco Voight 62-66 Controls 82





After identifying the sample of firms to represent the
aerospace industry, it was necessary to collect financial
information with which to compare the profitability of
defense versus commercial business.
B. DATA SOURCE
The Value Line investment survey was chosen as the
source of financial information specifically because it
22

provided a statistic critical to this study
—
government
business sales as a percentage of total sales. Use of this
measure of involvement in government (or, conversely, non-
government) business provides, through regression analysis
against common measures of profit, the ability to compare
which type of business, if either, is the more profitable.
Two measures of profit were reported in the data from 1961
to 1968; profit margin and percent earned on (book) common
equity (NI/NW)
. Profit margin is further defined as opera-
ting earnings before deduction of depreciation, interest and
income tax, expressed as a percentage of sales. From 1969
to 1982, the format of the sales-based data was varied
slightly and became net income/sales (NI/S)
.
The percentage of government business (%GOVTBUS) was not
reported for every firm in every year. When this piece of
data was missing, the particular firm was excluded from the
data set for that year. This did not constitute a signifi-
cant problem because an average of 80% of the entries
included the statistic. The firms listed in Table 2-2 are
those for which the percentage of government business was
regularly reported. A casual review of firms included in
the sample is all that is needed to convince an informed
The partial omission of this statistic was another fac-
tor which prompted the use of data from all of the firms
reported on in the Value Line's Aerospace Section.-
23

individual that this sample is a viable representative of
the aerospace industry. It should further be understood
that the percentage of government business is not neces-
sarily entirely defense oriented (e.g. NASA is not) , but
that the percentage of non-defense government business in
the aerospace field is limited, and should not detract from
the main thrust of this study.
The desire to further explain profitability by hypothe-
sizing a relationship between profit and the level of
capacity utilization within the aerospace industry prompted
the collection of the final piece of data. The average
annual percentage of capacity utilization (%CAPUTIL) for the
aerospace industry was recorded from data collected by the





Profit vs. Percent Government Business
The first phase of the data analysis involved
2
regression of the two profit measures, NI/S and NI/NW, indi-
vidually, as the dependent variable against %GOVTBUS as the
2Data from 1961 to 1968 were actually Profit Margin or
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation as a per-
centage of sales (EBITD/S) rather than NI/S. The distinc-
tion has no effect on the outcome of this study because only
a comparison of relative profit levels is desired. The data
are handled separately whenever combining it would introduce
error. For simplicity, the profit to sales percentage will
be referred to as NI/S.
24

independent variable. All regression analyses were per-
formed on a computer using a statistical program package
known as MINITAB. Three major pieces of information were
derived from the regression analysis; the equation of the
line (y=a+bx)
,
the coefficient of determination r 2
, and the
t-ratio of the coefficient b. The equations of the two
regressions, NI/S to %GOVTBUS and NI/NW to %GOVTBUS for each
year from 1961 to 1982, not only constitute a major result
of the profit vs. government business analysis, but are also
used as a major "source" of data for the profit vs. capacity
utilization analysis.
Phase two of the analysis was performed by first
determining the average profit as measured by both NI/S and
NI/NW, for each year and regressing it against the computed
average of the percentage of government business. This for-
mat reduced the data set to 22 values of NI/S, NI/NW; and
%GOVTBUS, one for each year. The result when using NI/NW
as the profit measure was a single equation, with related
statistics, to describe the annual average profit as a func-
tion of the annual average percentage of government business
performed. The regression analysis of the average NI/S
versus the average %GOVTBUS was handled in two parts, 1961
to 1968 and 1969 to 1982, respectively, because of the pre-
viously mentioned variation in the data format. This
resulted in two equations with related statistics for this
profit measure, versus the single equation for NI/NW.
25

Phase three of the analysis was based on taking the
aggregation technique one step further than averaging. The
twenty-two years of data— 477 observations—were lumped
together to form one big set, eliminating any annual refer-
ence. Again the NI/S data had to be treated in two separate
groups to account for the difference in magnitude between
"profit margin" and NI/S, resulting in two equations for
profit to sales and one equation for profit to net worth as
a function of the percentage of government business.
In summary, the initial three phases resulted in
regression equations which attempt to correlate the profita-
bility of aerospace firms, by two measures, with the amount
of government business in which they are involved, over a
period of 22 years. The three phases could be described as
annual, average, and aggregate respectively, to clarify the
distinction between their particular data formats. Each
phase has its own merits as well as drawbacks and selection
of a particular technique depends on the degree to which the
hypothesis to be supported is specified. The aggregate
technique, for example, allows only a description of a gen-
eral trend over the entire period rather than reference to a
single year or group of years.
2. Profit vs. Capacity Utilization
Phase four of the analysis introduces the aerospace
industry capacity utilization (%CAPUTIL) for the first time
26

as an independent variable. A second major departure from
the previous routine occurs in the way the dependent varia-
bles for this phase are derived.
Recalling that for each of 22 years there is an
equation relating NI/S to %GOVTBUS as well as another relat-
ing NI/NW to %GOVTBUS, it is possible to evaluate these
equations at the endpoints of the line. The outcome of this
evaluation will be profit measures, NI/S and NI/NW, for both
0% and 100% government business, or in other words, profit
measures as a function of all commercial or all governmental
business. The derived data was arranged in the format of
Table 2-3 prior to regression against %CAPUTIL.
Table 2-3 DERIVED PROFIT MEASURES FOR
GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL BUSINESS
1961-1968 NI/S 0% GOVTBUS NI/S 100% GOVTBUS
1969-1982 NI/S 0% GOVTBUS NI/S 100% GOVTBUS
1961-1982 NI/NW 0% GOVTBUS NI/NW 100% GOVTBUS
1961-1982 NI/S 100% GOVTBUS NI/NW 100% GOVTBUS
NI/S 0% GOVTBUS NI/NW 0% GOVTBUS
The objective of the regression analysis that fol-
lowed was to determine whether the newly formed governmental,
commercial, and ratio of governmental to commercial profit
measures were correlated to the capacity utilization. The
results of this particular section are potentially the most
27

significant with regard to their implications for future
defense contracting.
Phase five repeated the analysis done in phase four
with one major modification. A smoothing technique 3 availa-
ble within the MINITAB package was used to smooth the data.
This technique is particularly applicable when data has been
collected in a time series, as in this case. The major
thrust of this analysis was to discover historical trends
rather than to pinpoint a specific annual result, and there-
fore smoothing was considered to be complementary to the
desired results.
Phase six is the final phase of the capacity utili-
zation analysis. In the two preceding phases, profit meas-
ures derived from the resulting equations of Phase One were
regressed in their "raw" and "smoothed" forms against the
percentage of capacity utilization, which was also available
in the same two forms. In phase six a distinct departure is
made from these "derived" profit measures by returning to
the average annual profit as determined during phase two.
These average annual profits of the sample aerospace
3Resistant smoothers are built up by successive appli-
cations of simple smoothers such as; running medians: where
each value in the data set is replaced by the median of the
data values immediately before it and after it. Hanning:
this is a running average computed as z (t) =0 . 25Y (t-1) +0 .
5
Y (t) +0. 25Y (t+1) . Splitting: which uses a special method to
remove flat spots which often appear after running medians.




industry constitute a somewhat natural variable to be
regressed against the annual capacity utilization figures,
which are also an "industry" average. Results from this
phase were expected to be highly indicative of industry
trends, albeit subject to the inferential limitations
imposed when discussing the "average firm."
Summarizing phases four through six, derived profit
measures relating to either commercial or government busi-
ness or ratios thereof, are regressed against the average
annual percentage of capacity utilization in the aerospace
industry. Phases four through six are distinguished by
their respective data formats; raw and smooth "derived"
data, and averaged data.
The analytical results are presented in a format
very similar to the six phases previously described in this
section. It is important in trying to follow the detailed
description of results to remember the different phases and
their respective groupings. The following outline in




Table 2-4 FORMAT OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS PRESENTATION
Profits vs. Government Business
Independent Variable: %GOVTBUS







Profit vs. Capacity Utilization
Independent Variable: %CAPUTIL
Dependent Variables:
Government Business Profits (GOVBUSPROF)
NI/S - 100% GOVTBUS
NI/NW - 100% GOVTBUS
Commercial Business Profits (COMEUSPROF)
NI/S - 0% GOVTBUS
NI/NW - 0% GOVTBUS
Data Formats:







These new variables are "derived" from evaluating the
two endpoints of the regression line equations which resulted
from the initial annual analysis of NI/S and NI/NW vs.
%GOVTBUS. The respective endpoint values are then proposed
as data which is representative of the annual profitability





In establishing a methodology to analyze the risks
related to engaging in either commercial or governmental
aerospace business, the major difficulty encountered is in
defining from whose perspective the "risks" are to be
evaluated.
Investors, bankers, managers, and government procurement
personnel all have a slightly different viewpoint, and thus
different opinions, on whether one type of business is more
or less "risky" than another.
From the viewpoint of the firms, one of the most impor-
tant measures of risk is the volatility of returns. Their
ability to properly manage the firm's assets is often gauged
by the steadiness of the rates of return reported to inves-
tors. For this reason a comparison was drawn between the
spread of returns for all commercial business versus those
for all government business, as measured by the standard
deviation of each business line's respective ROI. The ROI
data used in this analysis is the "derived" NI/NW data pre-
viously described in footnote number five.
Another perspective from which to analyze risk is that
of the potential investor. Investors purchase equity
securities based on their potential for future earnings as
realized by dividends and/or increased stock prices. The
volatility of these potential earnings is assessed by two
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different measures reported by The Value Line Investment
Survey ; Beta and PSI.
Beta is a Greek letter used to denote the sensitivity of
a stock's price to fluctuations in the general market. As
such, the risk measured by Beta is "systematic" and cannot
be reduced through diversification. This "systematic" risk
is the component of risk for which the market must reward
investors with higher rates of return, according to the
"efficient market" theory. [Ref. 12] Systematic risk fac-
tors are economy related and are therefore typically exter-
nal to any specific firm or industry. By its very nature
then, a firm's Beta may be independent of the percentage of
government business in which it is engaged. A simple
regression analysis of Beta as the dependent variable
against the %GOVTBUS as the independent variable is used in
an attempt to test this contention. If systematic risk is
independent of the type of business performed, it can be
eliminated from the total risk equation, leaving only the
"unsystematic" or firm-specific risk.
The Price Stability Index (PSI) is a number from zero to
one hundred which measures the stability of a stock's price
over the past five years. The PSI is Value Line's measure
of total risk. Given that the analysis on Beta above elimi-
nates the systematic portion of total risk from further con-
sideration, then a definite correlation between PSI and
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%GOVTBUS through a second regression analysis would deter-
mine which type of business causes the higher "unsystematic"
risk. The unsystematic risk which remains includes for
example, a stock's sensitivity to developments peculiar to
its industry and to its company's competitive position and
financial condition.
Admittedly, from the standpoint of attracting equity
capital
,
the risk component measured by Beta is, theoreti-
cally, the only relevant one. In this analysis, though, the
potential investor was not initially proposed as a major
party to the controversy, so his perception of risk is not
really the issue. The risks that are truly relevant to this
study's area of concern are unsystematic which are important
to bankers, managers, and Government personnel in dealing




A. PROFITS VS. GOVERNMENT BUSINESS
1 . Annual Data
a. Net Income/Sales (1961-1982)
In general, the results of these regressions
show conclusively that commercial business has been more
profitable than government business during the last 22 years,
as measured by NI/S. The strongest support for this state-
ment can be found in the slopes of the regression equations.
As seen in Table 3-1 the slope 'b' is consistently negative
over the entire 22 year sample period. The negative slope
is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in
all but four years through 1976. This finding is confirmed
by observing the t-ratio values of greater than 2.00 in
Table 3-1. For those four years the slope was statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level. The regression
equations from 1977-1982 are consistent in magnitude and
direction with those which preceded them but they lack the




Table 3-1 NI/S vs. %GOVTBUS
Regression Equations (Y=a+bX) and Related Statistics
YEAR a b t-ratio 2r
1961 10.8 -0.049 -1.79 16.8
1962 13.8 -0.089 -8.40 77.1
1963 13.3 -0.094 -4.58 48.8
1964 15.0 -0.102 -5.34 60.0
1965 14.5 -0.091 -4.16 46.4
1966 12.9 -0.061 -3.34 42.6
1967 9.85 -0.040 -1.53 12.7
1968 11.9 -0.062 -2.34 28.2
1969 4.58 -0.026 -1.69 16.0
1970 4.92 -0.042 -2.79 37.4
1971 3.16 -0.021 -2.07 20.1
1972 4.66 -0.042 -2.80 32.9
1973 6.85 -0.074 -2.51 28.3
1974 4.86 -0.033 -3.77 48.7
1975 4.11 -0.023 -1.61 13.2
1976 5.27 -0.045 -2.96 31.5
1977 4.94 -0.017 -1.11 5.3
1978 5.21 -0.008 -0.55 1.4
1979 6.15 -0.014 -0.68 2.1
1980 6.64 -0.035 -1.30 7.1
1981 6.72 -0.041 -1.30 7.1
1982 5.48 -0.024 -1.21 5.7
b. Net Income/Net Worth (1961-1982)
In contrast to the distinct relationship discov-
ered between profit as measured by NI/S and government busi-
ness, the results using NI/NW are, statistically speaking,
inconclusive. As seen in Table 3-2 the values of the
t-ratio confirm that over the 22 year period there are only
three occasions (1972, 1980, 1981) when the results can be
said to be significant at the 95% confidence level. All of
the other 19 years are statistically less conclusive. This
lack of a statistically supportable relationship between
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NI/NW and %GOVTBUS essentially precludes any further deduc-
tions which require using a single year's data as evidence
Table 3-2 NI/NW vs. %GOVTBUS
Regression Equations (Y=a+bX) and Related Statistics
Year a b t-ratio 2r
1961 8.15 0.046 0.95 5.4
1962 10.5 0.021 0.67 2.1
1963 11.3 0.008 0.21 0.2
1964 14.9 -0.024 -0.61 1.9
1965 15.5 -0.011 -0.26 0.3
1966 16.1 -0.012 -0.32 0.7
1967 14.8 -0.016 -0.33 0.7
1968 13.0 0.007 0.14 0.1
1969 13.5 -0.022 -0.32 0.7
1970 14.5 -0.066 -1.07 8.1
1971 7.36 0.002 0.06 0.0
1972 12.9 -0.094 -2.02 20.3
1973 14.0 -0.068 -1.36 10.4
1974 13.6 -0.018 -0.44 1.3
1975 11.8 -0.011 -0.25 0.4
1976 14.1 -0.007 -0.13 0.1
1977 13.1 0.069 1.40 8.2
1978 14.6 0.052 1.35 7.9
1979 19.1 -0.032 -0.70 2.3
1980 21.4 -0.133 -3.86 40.4
1981 20.5 -0.135 -2.58 23.3
1982 11.6 0.010 0.25 0.3
Nonetheless, there are certain observations,
which, due to their repetitive nature, become noteworthy.
For example, plots of NI/NW vs. %GOVTBUS from year to year
show a similar wide degree of scatter about a relatively
2flat regression line. The fact that the r and t statistics
do not support the credibility of this line as a predictor,
does not entirely detract from the intuitive conclusion that
the difference in profitability between commercial and
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government aerospace ventures, although much smaller than




The results of the regressions using the average
of the NI/S and %GOVTBUS from each year are statistically
inconclusive. Instead of reaffirming the original results,
the averaging process in this case resulted in two equations
which show opposite results. The results of the regression
of averaged data from 1961-1968 is consistent with prior
results but the results of the 1969-1982 regressions show
that the profitability of commercial business is less than
that of the government. It is regrettable that the data
sets must be artificially separated at the 1968 to 1969
point due to the change in the manner in which NI/S was
reported for this creates a distraction in the analysis.
The most important result from this phase may be
the insight it provides into the errors which may be intro-
duced by the averaging process. Ironically, while attempt-
ing to deduce more on a general basis about the "average"
profitability, the results of the overall "average" regres-
sion equation turn out to be statistically inferior to the
parts which make it up by a sizeable margin. Comparison of
2
the r and t statistics for the averaged data from 1961-1968
with the statistics from the annual regressions dramatically
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conveys this message. Based on the problem arising from the
averaging process in this instance, the credibility of the
already statistically insignificant 1969-1982 results are
further diminished.
b. Net Income/Net Worth 1961-1982
Although the regression equation, Y=13 . 0-0 . 0021
2
(r =0.0, t=0.03) is again statistically insignificant the
observation of an almost negligible slope combined with a
Y-intercept consistent with expected results is again note-
worthy. Beyond this it would be fruitless to elaborate
except to say that the "averaged" results of NI/NW were con-
sistent with the "annual" results.
3 . Aggregated Data
a. Net Income/Sales 1961-1968 and 1969-1982
In contrast to the departure from expected
results which occurred when averaging the data, the results
of aggregating mirrored the annual image of profitability
versus government business. The equations obviously show
the effects of the years which make them up. The profita-
bility of commercial business, as measured by NI/S, is again
shown to be higher than that of government business. Fig-
ures 3-1 and 3-2 show the statistically significant results
for the periods 1961-1968 and 1969-1982, respectively.
b. Net Income/Net Worth 1961-1982
The aggregation of twenty two years of data into
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Fig. 3-2 NI/S vs. %GOVTBUS 1969-82 Aggregate Data
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collected, was an attempt to conclude something about the
period as a whole, in light of the reluctance of the indi-
vidual years to testify.
The resulting regression equation indicates that
for the whole period the profitability of commercial busi-
ness, as measured by NI/NW, has been higher overall than
that of government business, as seen in Figure 3-3. The
t-ratio statistic supports this finding at the 95% confidence
2level. The r statistic is particularly low because it has
an inverse relation to the number of observations (n) used,
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Profit vs. Government Business Summarized
In summary, aerospace industry profitability, as
measured by NI/S, has been shown to be negatively related
to the percentage of government business. This relation-
ship has occurred on a consistent basis throughout the
period under study and is wholly supported by the annual
and aggregate regression analyses. On the other hand, when
trying to distinguish between the profitability levels of
commercial versus government business using NI/NW, the
results are not so clear-cut. The most consistently
observed result of the analyses in this area is that in any
given year the profitability level is not well correlated
to the percentage of government business performed. However,
there was a statistically significant negative relationship
established in the aggregated data analysis which showed
commercial returns on net worth exceeding defense returns.
B. PROFITS VS. CAPACITY UTILIZATION
In general, the results of the regression analyses con-
ducted show that profitability and capacity utilization,
within the aerospace industry, are positively related. This
result was observed on a consistent basis throughout the
study, regardless of the profit measure used. The mix of
DOD versus commercial business, however, affects the degree
to which this observation is statistically supportable.
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!• Derived Data vs. Capacity Utilization
As previously described, the dependent variables
used in the analyses were derived from evaluating the end-
points of the original regression evaluations—NI/S and
NI/NW vs. %GOVTBUS. This manipulation provided annual meas-
ures of profitability, by both NI/S and NI/NW for either
government or commercial business. An additional feature
brought to bear on these results is the smoothing technique.
The raw and smooth results of phases four and five of the
analysis are presented together in the following sections
(a)
, (b) , and (c) to simplify what could be a rather
unwieldy description.
a. Government Business Profitability vs. Capacity
Utilization
Profits which aerospace firms experience on
Government contract work rise with rising utilization of
capacity. In other words, the busier the firms are the more
profitable they are. This result was found to be true for
both measures of profit, NI/S and NI/NW. As expected, the
smoothing technique enhanced the statistical quality of the
4
results by significantly reducing the data scatter. Again
due to the difference in magnitude between the NI/S data for
4The smoothing technique did have a negative, albeit
predictable impact on the Durbin-Watson statistic, which
measures autocorrelation of "tracking" of the data.
Smoothing, by its very nature, links each data values col-
lected in the time series to their immediate neighboring
values, producing the trend.
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the two periods 1961-1968 and 1969-1982, the analysis of
NI/S vs. %CAPUTIL is conducted in two stages.
The results of the regressions using both raw
and smoothed data are presented in Table 3-3.
Table 3-3 GOVTBUSPROF vs. %CAPUTIL








NI/S 1961-68 R 2.49 0.039 10.0
S 2.19 0.042 3.65 69.0
NI/S 1969-82 R -7.34 0.132 2.68 37.4
S -20.6 0.313 5.96 74.7
NI/NW 1961-82 R -0.462 0.162 1.59 11.2
S -5.5 0.228 2.93 30.0
b. Commercial Business Profits vs. Capacity
Utilization
Evaluating the NI/S and NI/NW vs. %G0VTBUS equa-
tions at the Y-intercept resulted in an annual measure of
commercial aerospace profitability. The regression of these
commercial business profit measures against the percentage
of capacity utilization resulted in a positive correlation,
as was the case in the preceding government business sec-
tion. Commercial business results mirror those of govern-
ment business with the exception that neither the raw nor
smoothed data versions of the 1961-68 NI/S results were
statistically significant. The raw and smoothed data
results are presented in Table 3-4.
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Table 3-4 COMBUSPROF vs. %CAPUTIL























For comparative purposes, government business
profits (GOVBUSPROF) and commercial business profits
(COMBUSPROF) are plotted against the percentage of capacity
utilization (%CAPUTIL) using both profit measures, NI/S and
NI/NW, in figures 3-4 and 3-5 respectively. The plot of
NI/S vs. %CAPUTIL in figure 3-4 is for the results of the
1969-82 period where the NI/NW plot covers 1961-82. In both
cases GOVBUSPROF is shown to rise at a faster rate than
COMBUSPROF.
c. Government/Commercial Profit Ratio vs. %CAPUTIL
Having treated the profit measures individually
as indicators of their respective types of business the next
step was to form a ratio of the endpoints of each line. The
magnitude of this ratio, as measured by NI/S was found to
rise with increasing utilization of capacity in the aero-































able to negotiate higher profits on defense contracts when
they were, relatively speaking, busier. The results of the
regression analysis which used NI/NW to form the ratio were
not statistically significant, but the trend was similar.
Figure 3-6 provides a graphical display of the relevant
results using the NI/S ratio.
It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the
profit ratio at full capacity shows that government business
would still be only about two-thirds as profitable as com-
mercial business.
2. Averaged Data vs. Capacity Utilization
The average of both NI/S and NI/NW for each year
were regressed against the average annual capacity utiliza-
tion percentage. The results were consistent with the pre-
vious findings that showed a positive relationship between
profitability and utilization of capacity. The sole draw-
back occurred when using the average of NI/S for the 1961-
1968 period which was found to not be statistically
significant. The results of the two significant equations
from these analyses are shown in figures 3-7 and 3-8.
3
.
Profit vs. Capacity Utilization Summarized
In summary, the "derived" profit measures of the two
types of aerospace business, commercial and government, have
both been shown to rise with increased capacity utilization.
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Fig. 3-6 GOVBUSPROF/COMBUSPROF vs. CAPUTIL (NI/S)
at which the profits (NI/S and NI/NW) rise. Government
business or "defense contracting" profits rise at a faster
rate than commercial profits as the aerospace industry's
capacity is more fully employed. Although parity between
the final profit levels is a rare occurrence, the implica-
tion is that commercial business would not so easily be dis-
tinguished as the more profitable during busy periods. The
averaged data results simply support the finding of
increased profitability with rising utilization, regardless
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• Volatility of Returns
The volatility of returns was measured by comparing
the variability of the annual ROI for commercial business
with that of government business. The twenty- two years of
values of NI/NW derived for both all commercial and all gov-
ernment business were averaged and the range of values
measured by standard deviation. The average NI/NW and stan-
dard deviation for defense work were 11.97% and 4.02,
respectively. The comparable commercial figures were 13.93%
and 3.41.
This finding constitutes a paradox with significant
implications. Not only have average returns been lower for
DOD business but the risks as viewed by managers have been
somewhat higher. The wider spread for government returns
indicates that there is a greater gap between the "winners"
and "losers" in defense contracting than in the commercial
field.
This may support the argument that some firms rea-
lize "excessive" profits on defense contracts but the impli-
cation for the defense industrial base as a whole is more
serious. The "winners" will view defense contracts as com-
parable to commercial endeavors in profitability and con-
tinue to compete for defense work. On the other end of the
spectrum, the "losers" whose returns have been below average,
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will likely opt not to compete. In other words, the wider
spread on a lower average return will tend to limit compe-
tition for defense contracts.
2. Beta and PSI vs. %GOVTBUS
As noted in the methodology section, "Beta" measures
the correlation of a stock's price fluctuation with the gen-
eral market. Unsystematic risk is assumed to be "diversi-
fied away" by holding large portfolios consisting of stocks
from many different industries. Unfortunately bankers
making loans, managers trying to manage, and government
personnel trying to procure a weapon system are not neces-
sarily concerned with the risks incurred by large institu-
tional investors on their total portfolios.
The suspicion that Beta would be somewhat naturally
unrelated to the amount of government business performed is
borne out by the results of the regression analysis of BETA
against the %GOVTBUS. The equation has a Y-intercept of
21.20 and a slope of 0.0001 which is combined with an r and
t-ratio of 0.1% and 0.12 respectively. Therefore we can
conclude that there is no statistically significant correla-
tion between risk and the amount of defense contracting per-
formed as measured by Beta J If a relationship can be
established between total risk and %GOVTBUS, the risk being
measured must therefore be of an unsystematic nature.
The result of regressing PSI against %GOVTBUS showed
that there is a definite relationship between total risk and
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the amount of government business performed. With an r 2
and t-ratio of 21.6% and -2.68 respectively, there is sta-
tistical evidence that more total risk is incurred with
defense contracting than with commercial work. The coeffi-
cient is -0.38 which would result in a reduction of a firm's
PSI rating by 3.8 could be expected from a 10% increase in
%GOVTBUS. Having essentially eliminated systematic risk as
a function of %GOVTBUS, the variation of stock price sta-
bility with %GOVTBUS can be said to be a result of non-market
forces
.
In essence then, the higher the percentage of gov-
ernment business performed, the more unstable a firm's stock
price becomes, because the company is operating at greater
risk. This may further be attributed to the defense firm's
being, for example, more sensitive to developments peculiar
to the industry, in a less competitive position than its
peers, or in more tenuous financial condition.
Whatever variables are contributing to the higher
instability in the stock prices, overall results point





A. PROFITABILITY OF DEFENSE VS. COMMERCIAL BUSINESS
In this study the objective has been to provide answers
to several controversial questions through analysis of
existing data. The first question was how profitable the
major aerospace firms are in their defense versus nondefense
business. The most vocal participants in this debate over
the profitability of defense contracts have tended to gravi-
tate toward the extreme opposite viewpoints. Congressmen
and Contracting Officers, as guardians of the public purse,
sometimes argue that defense contractors enjoy "excessive
profits" while the opposition, from various camps, decries
low profits as the cause of numerous ailments, including an
alleged erosion of the defense industrial base.
The analytical results show that the answer to this
question lies somewhere in between. Although profitability
as measured by NI/S was found to be higher for commercial
ventures, every firm in the sample was, in fact, doing some
percentage of both types of business. Given this condition,
a quantitative comparison between commercial and defense
profits using the endpoint levels is unrealistic. In other
words a firm with a 70%-30% mix of commercial to government
business would still realize a higher profit than its 30%-70^
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counterpart, but the magnitude of the difference would be
significantly reduced.
As stated in the analytical results, the difference in
profitability, as measured by NI/NW, was smaller, but the
edge goes to commercial business when the entire study
period is viewed as a whole. Aggregating the data did pro-
vide an important insight into the relative profitability of
the two types of business over the entire period but the
parties to the argument don't normally refer to twenty-two
year averages in supporting their positions. They are more
likely to be referring to the immediate past few years in
discussing profitability trends. Using this time frame the
answer to the questions of "which is more profitable" and
"to what degree" depends entirely on "when" the question is
posed. The plot of the smoothed ratio of government to com-
mercial business profits over time in figure 4-1 clearly
illustrates the time dependence of the answer to this
argument.
The other pitfall in talking about average profitability
trends is that the parties to the controversy normally are
not only time-specific but they also tend to be firm-
specific. Obviously the returns for each contractor are not
all the same when conducting government business. A limited
analysis of the data available on individual firms showed
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Fig. 4-1 GOVBUSPROF/COMBUSPROF vs. Time (NI/NW) 1961-82
profitability fell with the amount of defense contracting
performed, Lockheed's and Martin Marietta's were essentially
flat and Grumman ' s and Northrop* s rose. So while on average,
commercial profits, as measured by NI/NW, were slightly
higher than governmental, consideration of specific time
intervals and specific firms introduces sizable variations
in the answer.
B. PROFITABILITY VS. CAPACITY UTILIZATION
The ability of the government to "drive a hard bargain"
with respect to profit levels is apparently enhanced during
periods of relatively slack business activity. Aerospace
firms who, during busier periods, would prefer to use less
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profitable defense work as a "filler," find during slow
times that DOD becomes the only buyer of any "substance."
Because very few firms can "risk" becoming heavily dependent
on defense contracting, due in part to the vagaries intro-
duced by politics, they must regularly vary their percentage
of DOD sales with the changing business climate. 6
The implications for defense contracting personnel is
that when business is booming, firms will naturally attempt
to achieve profit levels from defense contracts which reach
parity with their commercial profit levels. It is at this
point where the results of the government's actions seem
paradoxical. It is extremely difficult to blend a long-term
strategy of providing sufficient incentive to maintain an
advancing technological competence and physical production
capability with a short-term one which ingrains a zeal for
parsimony in contract negotiations.
Frugality with the public dollar is a virtue to the tax-
payer, but taking advantage of a powerful negotiating posi-
tion could have a deleterious impact on both the current as
well as future contracts. It is likely that the contractor
who is forced to accept a lower profit will strive to
increase his return by minimizing his investment, which will
Politics can affect not only whether or not an item
will be procured at all but also when, how many, and from
whom it will be procured. Grumman may be the only aerospace




inevitably decrease his productivity and ultimately increase
acquisition costs to the government. [Ref. 5]
A second alternative to minimizing equity investment is
for the contractor to simply not engage in defense con-
tracting. Both of these alternatives are forms of erosion
of the defense base. The former reduces the quality of the
competition for defense business while the latter reduces
the quantity. It is therefore incumbent upon the government
to consider the symbiotic nature of its relationship with
the aerospace industry when negotiating profit levels, par-
ticularly during periods of reduced activity.
C. PROFITABILITY VS. RISK
The objective of the risk analysis was to use the
results to explain any differences in profitability which
were discovered. It is a generally accepted financial pre-
cept that the rate of return on investment (ROD , as meas-
ured by NI/NW, should be positively correlated with the
amount of risk incurred.
As previously discussed, the perception of risk is a
matter of perspective. The analytical results show as
expected that the securities markets do not assess either
type of business as being more sensitive than the other to
market fluctuations, as measured by beta. As noted in the
methodology, beta is applicable to diversified portfolios
where, on average, it can explain about 30% of most stock
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price changes in response to factors which affect the market
as a whole. The Price Stability Index (PSI) is on the other
hand a measure of a single stock's price volatility. In
this case the stock prices of firms engaging in higher per-
centages of government business were shown to be more
volatile—or more risky—based on the past five years.
Another result shows that the variability of returns for
government business as measured by the wider standard devia-
tion of NI/NW is also indicative of the individual corpora-
tion's financial risk. The final piece of evidence with
regard to variability of returns is the comparison of the
smoothed data plots in figures 4-2 and 4-3 of commercial and
governmental business profits (NI/NW) against time. Clearly
the commercial ROI has not experienced the degree of fluc-
tuation that has characterized the government business
returns.
The beta and PSI analysis are applicable to the more
recent past, while the variability of returns is a product
of the entire period. The shape of the government ROI curve
is a graphic example of the "roller coaster" ride of which
defense contractors often complain.
The most accurate conclusion to be drawn from this risk
analysis may not be the most obvious. Where as the majority
of the results support a conclusion of higher risk for
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conservative statement that the results don't support higher
risks for commercial business. In other words, if commer-
cial profits have been higher it hasn't been a natural con-
sequence of being exposed to higher risks. Conversely,
lower returns on government business are more than liklely
a result of procurement policies designed to limit profit
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c. 1 An analysis of the
profitability of major
defense aerospace con-
tractors.
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